“Like a typical mafia boss, Ivanishvili derives legitimacy from criminal groups, supplemented by the blessing of a deeply criminalized religious institution… Ivanishvili has replaced the state with a criminal–mafia syndicate. All these decisions are now a self-admission and exposure of that reality,” says political analyst Lela Jejelava.
We spoke with Jejelava about the case of Otar Partskhaladze: the former Chief Prosecutor under Georgian Dream is now accused by the same party’s prosecution of ordering a premeditated murder.
“Ivanishvili believes he still has one more life, like in computer games. He will sacrifice that life in the form of Kobakhidze’s team,” the analyst observes, adding that Ivanishvili’s next direct target will be Irakli Kobakhidze himself.
Batumelebi recorded an interview with political analyst Lela Jejelava:
Ms. Lela, what did the indictment of Otar Partskhaladze reveal to you? Georgian Dream’s former Prosecutor General is now accused by the current Georgian Dream prosecution of ordering a premeditated murder. In your view, what are we dealing with here?
The decisions being made today by the leadership of Georgian Dream by Bidzina Ivanishvili, because no one else is truly making decisions point to only one thing: the regime is in serious trouble. Imagine that over the course of 13 years, every acceptable figure of this government and every person close to Bidzina Ivanishvili has turned out to be corrupt, a thief, and now we have reached the point where one is allegedly a murderer.
Whether Partskhaladze is indeed the person who ordered the killing, whether Liluashvili is actually guilty of the charges against him we see that the authorities themselves are being forced to admit that for 13 years their regime consisted of mafia-criminal elements. For years, we all said that Bidzina Ivanishvili replaced the state with a criminal–mafia syndicate, and these decisions are now a self-admission and public exposure of that fact. There is no other way to describe it.
It does not take much insight to understand that none of this is happening because the situation is good or stable. If Ivanishvili had any remaining resources to continue governing in the same manner without a fundamental reset, he would naturally do so.
What problems is Bidzina Ivanishvili facing now?
His bench of reserves has become extremely narrow, especially given that after the New Year he will likely be forced to make an extremely difficult decision shifting responsibility for the poisoning of thousands of people with chemical substances onto Kobakhidze and his team. I am deeply convinced of this.
Why do you think Ivanishvili will have to punish Kobakhidze?
International pressure on this issue [the use of chemical weapons] will inevitably intensify. I do not rule out that our partners may initiate an international investigation, since the authorities clearly have no intention of doing so voluntarily.
Georgian Dream believes it can feed the public the results of Mamuka Mdinaradze’s five-day “investigation” as truth. These individuals are suspects, and only an international investigation can either dispel or confirm those suspicions.
The Georgian Dream government itself has not attempted to sue the BBC, despite promising to do so, in order to wash away this reputational stain though it is no longer a stain, but a verdict against Georgian Dream. A month was more than enough time to prepare such a lawsuit, yet we see nothing.
Ivanishvili believes he still has one more life, like in computer games. He will sacrifice that life in the form of Kobakhidze’s team. Ivanishvili will sacrifice Irakli Kobakhidze and his team to the new reality that will likely emerge after the New Year.
No matter what he does, Ivanishvili is in an extremely difficult position from an international political standpoint.
Is the indictment of former high-ranking officials linked to international pressure?
Ivanishvili no longer has partners. Relations with China are quite difficult China has no intention of investing in Georgia, and this has become clear. Relations with Turkey are also strained. The situation has worsened with Azerbaijan and Armenia as well. In an attempt to somehow mitigate this difficult situation, they paid tribute to Aliyev by allowing cargo to pass free of charge on a one-time basis.
There are clear corruption and criminal scandals linked to Ivanishvili’s team.
Ivanishvili’s system is based not only on security structures and his political team, but also on a power-sharing arrangement with criminal networks and the Church. When he faces a legitimacy problem, he is forced to include other actors in power-sharing arrangements in order to maintain control.
The Partskhaladze case is linked to the murder of a family member of a criminal authority. Accordingly, this appears to be a form of tribute this time to criminal groups. If criminal elements detach themselves from his system, his power will weaken by at least one-third.
In 2023, when Otar Partskhaladze was sanctioned by the United States, Georgian Dream protected him through a special scheme, including the active involvement of the National Bank. What has changed now?
That was a political issue, and he was able to manage it. But criminal networks are a direct component of his power, and this cannot be regulated through special decisions issued by Natia Turnava.
Turnava’s decision signaled that Bidzina Ivanishvili was prepared to make very difficult choices to preserve figures like Partskhaladze. But when he needed to do the same to protect Partskhaladze from criminal retaliation, he was unable to do so.
Do you believe that the so-called criminal underworld has such a strong influence over Ivanishvili’s inner circle?
Absolutely. Bidzina Ivanishvili’s power is not based on the legitimacy of Western institutions. His power is legitimized by criminal networks and by the Georgian Orthodox Church, which itself is heavily criminalized.
This is a farce called “the fight against corruption.” In reality, it is a reboot of a corrupt system and the replacement of old corrupt connections with new ones.
What does Ivanishvili gain by replacing old corrupt ties with new ones?
First, a larger segment of society becomes involved in criminal schemes. The more people are implicated in crime, the easier it becomes for Ivanishvili to manage the situation. These new individuals will once again find themselves trapped in these corrupt schemes what is often called the “octopus.” We will see an even greater number of people interested in gaining access to illicit funds, the state budget, and so on.
At the same time, Ivanishvili is facing a reality in which protests have not subsided. Whether large or small, the protest continues with varying dynamics. None of the prisoners of conscience have been broken. This was the fatal stumbling block for him: he believed it was impossible not to break at least someone among so many political and conscience prisoners.
Ultimately, every person is defeated by their own weaknesses rather than by external forces. Ivanishvili is not growing stronger through this process. I am convinced that he will inevitably be forced to relinquish power.
Why do you believe Ivanishvili is not becoming politically stronger? Despite protests, the ruling vertical remains intact, and through corrupt schemes, as you say, even more people are being drawn into silence.
In my view, three factors are crucial. First, the ongoing domestic protest that has not subsided. Second, non-recognition on the international stage. Third, the complex geopolitical environment: he has failed to establish proper relations not only with Western countries, but even with regional states.
Ivanishvili’s goal was to prevent Georgia from becoming an object of confrontation between Russia and the West. Through his policies, he ultimately achieved the exact opposite: Georgia did become an object of confrontation, but from a severely weakened position without friends or partners.
In doing so, Ivanishvili has placed the country, and his own power, in a far more difficult position than would otherwise have been the case.