“It is somewhat speculative to say whose interests were served by allowing relations at the borders to deteriorate to this extent. What is clear, however, is that neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan benefits from the current situation. The only force interested in tension between our two countries is Russia,” says international relations expert Giorgi Melashvili.
We spoke with Melashvili about developments in the South Caucasus, focusing first on Azerbaijan, where pro-government media outlets have recently been reporting on a deterioration in relations with Georgia.
“If, in the long term, Georgia’s isolationist approaches and the strengthening of Russian influence continue, Georgia will no longer be viewed as a safe, stable, and reliable partner. In that case, attention will increasingly shift to the southern branch of regional transit routes. This would cause serious economic damage for us. Instead of using the current geopolitical situation to intensify the development of the Middle Corridor, we risk ending up completely sidelined,” Melashvili says.
Batumelebi conducted this interview with Giorgi Melashvili, head of the European-Georgian Institute, lecturer at the Free University of Tbilisi, and specialist in international relations.
What is happening in Azerbaijani-Georgian relations? Pro-government Azerbaijani media claim that Azerbaijani drivers face problems in Georgia, that Tbilisi has increased tariffs on cargo transit, and that Baku is considering restoring a railway line to the Armenian border.
Let us start from a broader perspective. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the balance of power in the Caucasus changed sharply and significantly. This became evident during the Karabakh war, when Azerbaijan managed to realize its national interests and regained control over the Karabakh region. At the same time, Russia, on which Armenia relied, failed to assist its ally. Russian influence, particularly in Armenia, has decreased substantially.
As Russian influence declined, we saw increased engagement by the United States administration, including what has been referred to as the Trump Corridor or Trump Peace Route, which aligns with the national interests of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Alongside this, a third key actor has emerged, the Republic of Turkey. Historically, Armenia and Turkey have had highly strained relations, but following the resolution of the Karabakh issue, we are witnessing initial steps toward opening borders and normalizing relations.
Turkey and Armenia are reportedly planning to open their border by 2026.
I would be cautious on that point for now.
In general, normalization between Armenia and Turkey is a long-term process. It is also an important one, because it involves overcoming a series of historical traumas, which would be beneficial for the entire region.
This process also signifies a sharp reduction of Russian influence. Today, the Armenia-Turkey border is not guarded by Armenian border services but by Russia’s FSB. If normalization occurs, the presence of FSB forces on that border would lose any rational justification, and they would be forced to withdraw, including from sections of the border.
Russian influence is decreasing significantly in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The only regional actor where Russian influence is not diminishing but increasing is Georgia. The balance in the Caucasus is shifting, and not in Russia’s favor.
In this context, Georgian Dream has tried to convince the population that it is pursuing a balanced policy, claiming it seeks to balance the interests of all actors in a turbulent international environment. This was the core propaganda narrative. However, if we look at the reality, Georgian Dream has effectively pushed the West out of Georgia.
Any balancing equation in international relations requires multiple variables. When one of those variables is removed, balance becomes impossible, and the equation tilts toward another actor. As Western influence diminished in Georgia, a power vacuum emerged, and the only actor capable of filling it is the Russian Federation.
We therefore see the following reality: Russian influence is decreasing in Armenia while positive Western influence is growing. Azerbaijan has the capacity to defend its national interests independently or together with Turkey, and indirectly with NATO’s support. Georgia remains isolated. Relations with the West are at a historic low. Strategic partnership with the United States was suspended under the previous administration, and under the current administration, Georgia’s government has had no high-level meetings at all.
This contrast is particularly visible when compared with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both President Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan have visited Washington and held multiple meetings with US officials, including President Trump.
Why would Georgia provoke tensions with its strategic partner Azerbaijan under such isolation? And what calculations might Azerbaijan be making?
Tensions do not serve the national interests of either Georgia or Azerbaijan. Both countries are part of the Middle Corridor. The northern branch of this corridor, which passes through Georgia, is currently the most important. However, if normalization between Turkey and Armenia is achieved, the northern route will face natural competition from a southern branch. Cargo flows and economic benefits would then be divided, and Georgia would lose its unique geopolitical function.
A countermeasure could have been the creation of competitive advantages, such as developing the Anaklia deep-sea port. Instead, Georgian Dream not only failed to advance this project but turned it into another source of conflict with Western partners.
As for Azerbaijan, its immediate national interest is establishing communication with Armenia at minimal cost. Georgia’s interest is, of course, to generate greater economic value. However, we have seen similar border-related complaints from Armenia in the past regarding Georgian procedures.
It is speculative to say whose interests were behind the deterioration of border relations, but it is clear that neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan benefits. The only actor that benefits from tension between the two is Russia.
Does Russia benefit indirectly from this situation? Is there evidence of a specific scheme?
The deterioration of Georgian-Azerbaijani relations benefits only the Russian Federation at this stage. Russia has lost most of its leverage in the Caucasus, and the only government attempting to maintain close relations with Moscow is the Georgian Dream regime.
Tensions between Georgia and Azerbaijan undermine the entire concept of the Middle Corridor. Blocking the northern branch would affect massive infrastructure passing through Georgia, from oil pipelines to road networks developed over the past 30 years.
Do you believe the Georgian government raised railway transit tariffs in line with Russian interests? What should an objective government have done?
Whether the tariff increase was intentional is less important than the outcome. The result aligned with Russian interests and placed the Georgian-Azerbaijani strategic partnership under question once again.
Georgian Dream’s core strategic mistake is remaining without allies. For a small country like Georgia, the absence of strong allies invites neighboring states to pursue their own national interests more aggressively.
In this case, Azerbaijan is acting assertively to protect its interests. Publicizing these issues is a diplomatic and political signal to Georgian Dream that such actions are unacceptable. If they continue, Azerbaijan will be compelled to take stronger diplomatic steps.
Why does this benefit Azerbaijan, given that increased Russian influence in Georgia poses a threat to the entire South Caucasus?
That is precisely why the southern branch is being discussed. It is a warning to Georgia that Azerbaijan has the resources and economic capacity to activate the southern route rapidly.
After regaining Karabakh, Azerbaijan rebuilt infrastructure in an extraordinarily short period. It has both the experience and financial capacity to implement the southern route quickly if Georgian Dream continues its current approach.
Georgian Dream announced that Azerbaijani cargo would pass through Georgia free of charge on a one-time basis. What does this reaction indicate?
It shows that Georgian Dream received the signal and responded accordingly. However, this is a one-off decision. We do not know how the government will act in the long term.
If euro-isolation and the strengthening of Russian influence continue in Georgia, Azerbaijan will intensify its focus on the southern branch. Georgian Dream has failed to update either its national security strategy or its foreign policy vision.
If isolationist approaches persist, Georgia will no longer be viewed as a safe, stable, and reliable partner. Attention will increasingly shift to the southern route, causing serious economic damage to Georgia. Instead of capitalizing on geopolitical opportunities, we risk being sidelined entirely.
If Georgian Dream is relying on the terminal built in the Gali district, I do not believe this is a sound long-term economic strategy.
Turning to Armenia, what were the most important messages from Prime Minister Pashinyan’s meeting with Chancellor Merz?
The most significant development, both literally and symbolically, was the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between Germany and Armenia.
Historically, Germany’s partner in the Caucasus was Georgia, dating back to the First Republic. Georgian Dream’s actions, including attacks on the German ambassador, led to the ambassador’s recall. In this context, Germany is now supporting the country in the region that wants assistance, and that country is Armenia.
Can it be said that Armenia is replacing Georgia in the South Caucasus?
Not yet. But if Georgian Dream continues its euro-isolation policy and deepens Russian influence, Armenia will indeed replace Georgia in the Caucasus.
Why did Chancellor Merz emphasize the threat of Russian disinformation? Is it realistic that Russia could use hybrid warfare to replace Pashinyan with a pro-Russian candidate in Armenia’s June 2026 elections?
Russia actively uses disinformation and propaganda. We saw this clearly during Moldova’s elections. The same methods will be used against Pashinyan and the European Union in Armenia.
Propaganda infrastructure has become one of Russia’s most powerful tools. It is used continuously, not only during elections, to weaken public resilience and amplify fears when the time is right.
It is still too early to predict Armenia’s election outcome. Local elections showed a difficult situation, and surveys indicate that while attitudes toward the EU are more positive than negative, they are not deeply entrenched. This makes Armenian society vulnerable to propaganda, myths, and disinformation aimed at discrediting the current government.