“The Russians are advancing slowly and at the cost of heavy casualties. Their progress is so slow that Ukrainians manage to set up the next defensive lines,” says retired General Vakhtang Kapanadze, who continues to closely monitor the war in Ukraine. According to the military analyst, negotiations on a ceasefire are likely to resume by the end of the year, but before that, Russia will attempt to capture Pokrovsk. “If Pokrovsk is taken, the Russians will approach negotiations with stronger leverage,” the retired general says.
“The Russians are trying to move forward on foot, in groups of three to five soldiers, attempting to pass city access points and somehow infiltrate. They are constantly being struck by drones. If one out of three soldiers reaches the target point, it is considered a success.
Ukrainians are operating drones quite effectively along the front line. Losses of armored vehicles in the Russian armed forces have decreased fourfold… not because the equipment is better protected, but because Russia has stopped using it it constantly falls victim to drones. Tanks and armored vehicles have essentially become mere transport means for Russians, used only to deliver personnel somewhere,” the retired general explains.
Batumelebi interviewed retired General Vakhtang Kapanadze, Doctor of Military Sciences, who served twice as Chief of the General Staff of Georgia. He is currently an adviser to the analytical organization GeoCase.
Mr. Vakhtang, what is happening on the front line? As we know, the Pokrovsk sector is particularly difficult…
Yes, that’s correct. At this stage, the main fighting is concentrated around Pokrovsk.
Russia continues to amass forces in the central areas of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. They have begun infiltrating the Kozatsky district west of Myrnohrad. Fighting is underway in the northern sector of Pokrovsk; however, in the city center, Ukrainian forces removed a Russian flag from the administration building and raised the Ukrainian one. This means Ukrainians are also advancing toward the city center, indicating that the Russians do not fully control the occupied territory.
In 2022, when the war began, Russia deployed around 180–190,000 troops across all of Ukraine. Today, on the limited Pokrovsk axis alone, Russia has concentrated around 100,000 troops.
I believe that in 10–15 days, Ukrainians may face a dilemma: whether to withdraw their forces. Otherwise, they risk having to fight while encircled.
The Russians previously failed to complete an encirclement are they succeeding now?
So far, they are still 3–5 kilometers short of fully closing the encirclement. It cannot be said that Russia already controls Pokrovsk or Myrnohrad. These are essentially two cities where the main fighting is taking place.
Urban combat is ongoing. It is chaotic, involving small groups, with close-range fire contacts. Drones dominate the airspace on both sides. Since Russians have managed to enter parts of the city, it is possible they will attempt to organize further assaults.
Could Ukrainians continue fighting under encirclement? What prospects would that have?
Such a decision is possible. Ukraine might choose to continue fighting while encircled and later attempt a breakout, or use the encirclement to strengthen operations in other directions.
The Russians attempt to advance on foot, in groups of three to five, trying to cross city approaches and infiltrate positions. They are under constant drone strikes. If one out of three reaches the objective, it is considered a success. This is how they gradually accumulate forces.
What is Russia’s strategy, in your view? Fighters from Ukraine’s 7th Air Assault Brigade say Russian troops entering Pokrovsk are not fortifying positions but pushing forward to further fragment Ukrainian forces.
The Russians regroup and continue attacking. Of course, they establish positions and move on. Grishyno, north of Pokrovsk, is one of their intended directions of advance. That appears to be the vector. Fighting is also ongoing in Myrnohrad, adjacent to Pokrovsk — roughly half of the city is already under Russian control.
Myrnohrad is in a particularly difficult situation and could be more easily cut off from Ukrainian forces. At this stage, Ukrainians are preventing the Russians from completing the encirclement. Footage has been published showing Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate special unit “Temur” clearing a factory area in Pokrovsk of Russian forces. Overall, the deployment of special forces enabled Ukrainians to create a corridor through which reinforcements were brought in.
At the same time, operations are underway to clear settlements. There is the Dobropillia salient north of Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad. I mentioned this direction in a previous interview. Ukrainians managed to fully destroy that Russian grouping.
There is an opinion that Gerasimov’s future depends on whether Pokrovsk is captured by mid-November. Since Bakhmut fell in spring 2024, is Pokrovsk the next city Russia has been trying to seize?
Yes, but Pokrovsk is not a large city. If taken, it would be the only city after Bakhmut that Russia has captured following a year and a half of fighting.
What does this pace indicate?
It shows that Russians lack high operational tempo and the ability to conduct breakthroughs. They advance slowly, at the cost of massive casualties. Their pace is so slow that Ukrainians manage to construct successive defensive lines.
If Pokrovsk falls, what kind of success would it be for Russia beyond propaganda value?
Unfortunately, the media pays excessive attention to the Pokrovsk direction. Ukrainians, too, focus heavily on it, which is a mistake. The battle for Pokrovsk coincided with Trump-related negotiations, so both sides tried to demonstrate that their frontline situation was not bad.
In reality, Pokrovsk is a medium-sized settlement. Russia has been trying to capture it for a year and a half. Even if they succeed, the so-called “pocket” in Russian-controlled territory would simply disappear — nothing more. Pokrovsk is not decisive.
To fully control Donbas, Russia would need to capture the heavily fortified Kramatorsk–Sloviansk agglomeration. To reach that, they must first take Konstantynivka, Druzhkivka, and other settlements.
At this pace, it would take Russia at least five years to occupy Donbas.
Russia is also trying to improve its position near Kupiansk, in the Kharkiv direction. They crossed parts of the Siverskyi Donets River, but not all. Fighting continues there, though not at the intensity seen near Pokrovsk.
There have also been actions in the Zaporizhzhia region. After two Russian armored columns were completely destroyed near Tokmak, Russia still attempted to advance, but entirely unsuccessfully.
Russia continues drone and missile strikes, including on Odesa’s ports. Why has Odesa become a target again?
Such strikes are ongoing and not limited to Odesa. Ukrainians are also striking Russia with drones. Ukraine has shifted its focus from oil refineries and warehouses to energy infrastructure.
After Russia began striking Ukraine’s and Kyiv’s energy facilities, Ukrainians responded symmetrically. For example, there were 27 such strikes in 2024, but already 39 in 2025.
The result is what we’ve seen blackouts in Russian regions. Ukraine can strike targets up to roughly 1,000 kilometers deep into Russia.
This is primarily a tool of moral pressure. Ukrainians argue that electricity supports military operations, but largely this is a mirror response so Russian citizens also feel the hardship of winter cities left without power and heating.
Ukraine has a certain advantage in drone usage. Drone operator units account for about 2% of Ukraine’s armed forces. Experts believe that increasing this to 5% would significantly enhance capabilities.
On the front line, Ukrainian drones are highly effective. Russian armored vehicle losses have dropped fourfold: what they lost in one week in 2024, they now lose in a month. This is not because the equipment is better protected, but because Russia simply no longer uses it — it is constantly destroyed by drones before reaching the front. Tanks and armored vehicles have become mere transport tools for Russians.
In contrast, Ukrainians manage to use armored vehicles because they are largely on the defensive and require less maneuvering. Additionally, Ukrainian counter-drone systems are highly active under conditions of drone dominance in the air. Russian soldiers complain that their reconnaissance drones are being destroyed by Ukrainian drone interceptors.
Seasonal factors also matter: in November, movement becomes harder due to rain and mud, while cloud cover and fog complicate drone operations.
A notable operation was carried out by Ukrainian drone operators: using a ground robotic evacuation vehicle, they rescued a wounded soldier on the seventh attempt. He had been trapped for 33 days deep in enemy territory. The robot endured air strikes, detonated a landmine, lost a wheel but the wounded soldier was inside an armored capsule and was evacuated safely.
Why has nuclear rhetoric intensified? Putin has announced the possibility of resuming nuclear tests and mentioned new systems like the Burevestnik missile and the Poseidon underwater drone. Trump also spoke about nuclear tests.
No one knows whether Burevestnik was actually tested. If it was, why hasn’t footage of it flying been shown? What we saw was animation.
Secondly, Burevestnik is not new. In the 1960s, both the US and the USSR explored nuclear-powered cruise missiles. It’s a conventional cruise missile with a nuclear engine that allows longer flight time meaning greater range.
However, it emits an enormous heat signature and radioactive trail, making detection easy. It is not supersonic. The Americans concluded it was impractical and abandoned it. Putin’s statements are simply another threat.
Does anyone seriously believe Putin is ready to wage nuclear war against the US? Of course not.
How are Ukraine’s military capabilities evolving, especially after the US refused to supply Tomahawks, while the UK continues deliveries of Storm Shadow missiles?
Ukraine is undergoing forced military modernization. Older-generation equipment has largely been lost in combat. The assistance Ukraine now receives is increasingly modern.
Ukraine recently received Italian Centauro armored vehicles and additional British weapons – Storm Shadow, the French SCALP.
If Ukraine receives Taurus missiles, that would provide a 500-kilometer range.
Tomahawk is a high-precision missile carrying a 450-kg warhead. But Ukraine’s domestically produced “Flamingo” can fly up to 3,500 kilometers and carry nearly a ton of explosives. It’s not high-tech, but Ukraine has also developed a long-range Neptune missile with British support, capable of reaching 2,000 kilometers.
So it’s not true that Ukraine critically lacks something because it didn’t receive Tomahawks. It would have been better to get them, of course, but it wouldn’t be a breakthrough.
It’s also possible Ukraine may still receive Tomahawks. This may be a pause intended to bring Russia to the negotiating table.
How quickly are sanctions draining Russia’s war resources? How long could it take to force Russia to retreat?
Sanctions primarily affect Russia’s economy. Russia has shifted toward a war economy, weakening other sectors. Economic decline indirectly affects the military, but first and foremost it impacts social and economic indicators.
At this pace, Russia can continue the war for another five to eight years. Putin does not place much value on social welfare.
Sanctions alone won’t end the war. They are tools to push Russia toward negotiations.
Russia still refuses a ceasefire. Will Putin eventually agree?
Putin is willing to agree to a ceasefire but on his terms. That’s why Russia is trying to take Pokrovsk and approach negotiations with a straightened front line.
If Pokrovsk’s fate is decided by the end of the year, do you expect renewed ceasefire talks?
Yes. I believe negotiations will intensify by the end of the year.
At the moment, Trump’s attention has shifted to Venezuela, but all factors point toward Russia and Ukraine eventually sitting down at the negotiating table.