How have higher education systems in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan been formed and how are they evolving? What development models do experts identify? How do these systems differ from one another, and what impact does the political environment have on international integration? An interview with education expert Lela Chakhaia.
How were higher education systems formed in the three South Caucasus countries Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and in what direction are they developing? What types of development models do we see in these countries, and how different are they from one another, especially after the reform announced by Georgian Dream?
Let us begin with the historical context. All three countries inherited the Soviet model in the 1990s, which was characterized by a sharp separation between research and teaching, with research concentrated in academies of sciences and teaching in universities, strict centralization and ideological control, and narrow specialization of universities.
From the 2000s onward, all three countries joined the Bologna Process, although its implementation proceeded with varying depth.
There are several similarities between the systems. In the 1990s, higher education systems expanded and experienced rapid growth of the private sector. A defining feature of all three systems is the extremely low share of public funding in higher education, resulting in strong reliance on tuition fees paid by families and students. This is particularly evident in Georgia, where the state spends only 0.2 percent of GDP on higher education.
Low levels of public spending may partly explain why the quality of higher education in all three countries remains relatively low according to various criteria.
All three systems are also characterized by inequality in access to higher education based on socio economic status.
Although private sources, primarily student tuition fees, account for a high share of higher education funding in all three countries, the systems differ significantly in the number of public and private universities.
Georgia: 19 public, 45 private
Armenia: 26 public, 31 private
Azerbaijan: 33 public, 11 private
We can identify three distinct development trajectories.
Georgia: Dominance of market principles until 2025
The post Soviet transition led to an expansion of the private sector and strong dependence on tuition fees, which reflects a broader regional logic. In 2005, Georgia became a full member of the Bologna Process and the European Higher Education Area, providing a long term framework for alignment with European standards. Quality assurance systems were made compatible with European quality assurance frameworks.
Recently announced reforms aim to place the higher education system under stronger state control. These planned measures are highly likely to result in international isolation and distancing from the European higher education system. Notably, Georgia has lost its membership in the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education.
Armenia: European framework plus institutional focus on quality assurance and attempts at systemic renewal
In Armenia, the post Soviet transition produced a mixed ecosystem with nearly equal numbers of public and private institutions. The main external quality assurance agency in Armenia is ANQA, which is a member of the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education. In 2022, the Armenian government approved the State Program for Education Development until 2030, covering all levels of education. In higher education, the goal is to strengthen international integration and improve quality so that at least four Armenian universities enter the global top 500 rankings.
One of the key elements of Armenia’s higher education vision is the plan to establish and build an Academic City. The project was announced by the Armenian government in 2022 and is part of the country’s Education Strategy 2030.
Current stage 2024 to 2025: the project has moved into the practical planning phase. In 2024, the government approved a Master Plan prepared by the German architectural firm gmp Architekten. The selected location is northwest of Yerevan, along the Ashtarak highway.
Consolidation model: Armenia plans to create clusters of six state universities instead of the current dozens of dispersed institutions. These clusters will cover classical studies, technology, arts, education, medicine, and officer academies.
Infrastructure: the city is designed for 44,000 students and faculty and will include not only academic buildings but also housing, research laboratories, and even a national stadium.
At first glance, Georgia’s announced “one city, one faculty” approach may resemble Armenia’s Academic City plan, as both aim to optimize resources of public universities. However, the key difference is that Armenia’s Academic City is explicitly based on strengthening the link between research and teaching, as well as promoting interdisciplinary education. In Georgia, by contrast, the proposed reform would hinder interdisciplinary education. Another major difference is that Armenia’s plan is spread over several years and implemented gradually. The reform in Armenia faces resistance from academic circles, who perceive it as an infringement on autonomy and an attempt to redistribute real estate.
Azerbaijan: A state led model
Azerbaijan’s system is the most clearly centralized in the region, both in institutional structure and policy instruments.
Development priorities are often articulated through state programs and legislative changes. A 2018 presidential decree approved the State Program on Increasing the International Competitiveness of the Higher Education System for 2019 to 2023, assigning the Ministry of Education responsibility for coordination and annual reporting to the president.
Formally, the law on higher education states that the system should move closer to the European educational space. In practice, Azerbaijan resembles a centralized, state led modernization model, where international competitiveness and the European space are frequently referenced, but policy tools remain largely state driven through decrees, state programs, and centralized frameworks.
The Azerbaijani higher education system is also characterized by the presence of elite institutions such as the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, the Baku Higher Oil School, and the French Azerbaijani University. These institutions were established under direct presidential patronage and financed through oil funds.
What role do political regimes, styles of governance, and state attitudes toward academia play in shaping these differences? To what extent can higher education in these countries be considered independent from political influence?
All three countries face problems related to academic freedom and institutional autonomy.
Political regimes can influence higher education through several channels in practice. These include leadership selection and appointments, such as rectors, councils, and deans. When governance is driven by political appointments, autonomy weakens. Funding and resource allocation also matter, as budget dependence increases political control, and consolidation or restructuring can become political leverage determining who gains and who loses. Accreditation and quality assurance are another channel; if quality assurance institutions are not truly independent, programs and personnel are easily politicized. Curriculum control and sensitive topics such as history, identity, and conflicts are particularly vulnerable. Finally, restrictions on civic space including media, NGOs, and freedom of assembly reduce space for critical debate and research freedom within universities.
In terms of regime type, governance style, and attitudes toward academia, the countries differ as follows.
Azerbaijan: Consolidated authoritarianism and low autonomy
In Freedom House 2025, Azerbaijan is rated as not free with a score of 7 out of 100 and is described as a regime where power is highly concentrated and opposition and independent activism are restricted. In this context, the authorities have long limited academic freedom. There have been documented cases of teachers being dismissed for alleged links to the opposition and students being punished for similar reasons. Under such a regime, the political independence of universities is structurally low.
Armenia: Party competitive reformist transition and medium autonomy
In Freedom House 2025, Armenia is rated as partially free with a score of 54 out of 100. Greater pluralism and competitive politics in Armenia’s higher education space generally create more room for academic debate. However, a difficult security environment and regional tensions, also noted in the same assessment, often strengthen a state security logic that indirectly affects universities. Independence in Armenia is generally more realistic than in Azerbaijan, but remains vulnerable to political and security cycles.
Georgia: Hybrid pluralism, signs of democratic backsliding, and growing risks, especially in the context of the reform
In Freedom House 2025, Georgia is rated as partially free with a score of 55 out of 100, which is lower than the previous year.
The provisions outlined in the higher education reform concept grossly violate norms of institutional autonomy and academic freedom. Measures justified as resource optimization, such as the “one city, one faculty” approach that entails redistributing faculties in state universities based on traditional profiles and historical experience, contradict universities’ autonomy to determine their own academic missions, priorities, and organizational structures. Severe interference with academic autonomy also includes restrictions on enrolling foreign students in state universities, rigid determination of student admission quotas based on state orders and labor market analysis, the introduction of a 3 year bachelor’s plus 1 year master’s system, which constitutes a serious violation of academic autonomy and freedom, and the personnel policies for academic staff outlined and publicly articulated in the reform concept, which infringe on universities’ autonomy in managing their academic workforce.
In your assessment, which country is the most integrated into the international academic and research space?
Criteria for assessing international integration include Erasmus Plus mobility, joint publications, and implementation of the Bologna Process.
Georgia still remains the most integrated into the Western academic space, particularly in the humanities and social sciences. However, if the reform is implemented, the proposed changes will pose a serious threat to the compatibility of Georgia’s quality assurance system with European and other international recognition bodies such as the European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education, the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, and the World Federation for Medical Education. Deviating from these standards poses significant risks to the credibility, comparability, and international reputation of higher education degrees awarded in Georgia.
Azerbaijan has been successful in individual high budget partnerships, for example with BP support or cooperation with Turkish universities.
Armenia has traditionally been closely connected to both the Francophone space and Russian academic circles. However, according to European Commission data from 2025, Armenia’s participation in European research projects is increasing.
Is there real potential for regional cooperation in higher education in the South Caucasus through joint programs, research networks, or student mobility?
The potential for regional cooperation in higher education in the South Caucasus is paradoxical. Technical and academic demand is high, but political and structural barriers prevent this potential from being realized.
There are areas where national interests align and cooperation would bring pragmatic benefits. These include ecology and environmental protection, as the Caucasus ecosystem is unified. Research networks addressing climate change, glacier melting, and management of the Kura river basin are not only desirable but necessary. Energy and transport are another area, as development of the Middle Corridor requires joint engineering and logistics research and creates potential for joint master’s programs.
However, several barriers hinder realization of this potential. Three main factors are decisive.
Geopolitical vetoes: the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan rules out direct intergovernmental cooperation. Any joint project is currently possible only through third party platforms such as the European Union, the United States, or multilateral frameworks.
Divergent foreign orientations: Georgia has until recently been oriented toward the European Higher Education Area. Armenia seeks to balance between European and Russian Eurasian Economic Union standards. Azerbaijan prioritizes bilateral partnerships with Turkey and leading Western universities over regional integration.
Weakening of Georgia’s role: Georgia traditionally served as a regional hub, for example through institutions such as the International Black Sea University or GIPA, where students from all three countries studied. However, changes in domestic political direction and restrictions on academic freedom reduce Georgia’s attractiveness as a neutral and free space for neighbors.
Student mobility and research networks in the region are outward oriented rather than regional. Students prefer to go to Europe, Turkey, or Russia rather than to neighboring countries. Prospects for joint programs are currently limited to virtual mobility or remote research projects. According to Georgia’s new reform concept, public universities are prohibited from admitting international students, which further restricts potential mobility within the region.
Research networks have the greatest potential in STEM fields, as laboratory equipment is expensive and resource sharing would be logical. However, due to lack of political will, this remains largely theoretical.
At present, cooperation in higher education in the South Caucasus remains at the level of potential. Georgia’s announced reform, which prioritizes internal control over international openness, further distances the country from its status as a regional leader. Ultimately, regional cooperation will not materialize as long as education policy is treated as an instrument of foreign policy rather than as a means of shared economic development.