“What ‘Georgian Dream’ did today through the Prosecutor’s Office is, in practice, a provocation of the European Union an attempt to push the EU to say it is closing all relations with Georgia. That is exactly what Russia also wants: to provoke such a reaction and geopolitically isolate Georgia,” says political analyst Kakha Gogolashvili.
We spoke with Kakha Gogolashvili, a political analyst and Director of the Center for European Studies, about the latest decision of the ‘Georgian Dream’–controlled Prosecutor’s Office, which has brought new charges against opposition leaders.
“This is a message saying: I have hostages, and the moment you start excessive criticism, I will act even worse… This is a method—put people in prison and then bargain with the European Union, and possibly with the United States as well: ‘We will release them, but you must ease the sanctions.’
The European Union understands this as well: if Georgia is under Russia’s influence, it must be careful not to push the country entirely into Russia’s grip.
For the EU, a country is first and foremost its people, not its government. ‘Georgian Dream,’ however, believes that the government comes first,” says Kakha Gogolashvili.
Batumelebi recorded an interview with Kakha Gogolashvili.
Mr. Gogolashvili, in your view, what is behind Ivanishvili’s latest move following the EU’s harsh assessment-bringing new charges against eight opposition leaders?
It does resemble an attempt at a counterstrike. It is a fact that this move coincided with the EU’s very critical report on Georgia. On the one hand, that seems obvious. On the other hand, I also believe that ‘Georgian Dream,’ and Bidzina Ivanishvili personally, have a very coherent plan and act according to it. They rarely make spontaneous moves, including emotional ones.
There is another view that also deserves consideration: they are expecting tough sanctions from the EU and therefore want to turn the arrest of political leaders into a bargaining chip.
This is roughly how Putin acted toward the United States, when he effectively exchanged his agents for dissidents people who had been imprisoned for democratic activism.
This is the method: imprison people and then bargain with the EU, and possibly the United States saying, “We’ll release them if you soften the sanctions.”
Lukashenko did the same in principle he released a significant number of political prisoners in exchange for the West declaring that it no longer had major claims against him and easing sanctions. ‘Georgian Dream’ learns everything from Belarus and Russia. That is why they behave exactly the same way.
What benefit does such a “counterstrike” bring to ‘Georgian Dream’ domestically?
First of all, it serves domestic consumption. They equate the opposition with the EU and amplify the message that they are not afraid and that they are striking “EU agents” and their supporters.
Secondly, it forces the EU to think about what to do and how to deal with this regime in order to bring it to negotiations.
This is a message: I have hostages, and the moment you begin excessive criticism, I will act even worse. Internally, the report was perceived as an attempt to weaken ‘Georgian Dream’ to humiliate it in front of its own electorate. That is why ‘Georgian Dream’ responds by saying: if you want to weaken us, we will weaken you.
With this step, ‘Georgian Dream’ is telling the EU that it does not care about its assessments and can act even more brutally: “We are here, and we control the situation.”
So ‘Georgian Dream’ is defending its own sovereignty at the expense of Georgia’s European future?
Yes, exactly. ‘Georgian Dream’ is not defending the country’s sovereignty it is defending its own.
‘Georgian Dream’ considers itself sovereign over this territory, and if anyone wants something, they must raise their hand and speak to it accordingly.
Despite harsh criticism in the enlargement report, the EU still leaves room for cooperation. EU Commissioner Marta Kos said: “Stop imprisoning opposition leaders, journalists, and dissenting voices, and then we can talk.” What does this indicate?
The EU does not intend to sever relations with Georgia or block all channels. If that were the case, Georgia would not have been included in the report at all, and the EU would have said: “We have no relations with Georgia; when they improve, we will resume assessments.”
I know there was discussion about whether to include Georgia in the enlargement report at all. Excluding Georgia would have been a signal that it is no longer a candidate country, no longer part of the enlargement package. That would have been catastrophic.
In the end, the EU chose a constructive approach: pointing out mistakes and saying, “If you start correcting them, we will continue dialogue; if not, there will be no dialogue.”
In response, ‘Georgian Dream’ has done the opposite and closed the door even further.
The EU is trying to show that it has not abandoned the Georgian people. They clearly see how power has been usurped in Georgia.
For the EU, the country is the people, not the government. ‘Georgian Dream,’ however, believes the government is the country. This is a fundamental conceptual difference.
What expectations does the EU have from ‘Georgian Dream’? For example, shortly before the enlargement report, the Euronest resolution referred to the government as “self-proclaimed.”
Euronest is a political body without executive powers. It is a forum of the European Parliament and Eastern Partnership countries, where politicians not civil servants participate. They formulate political positions that do not have a direct effect on EU–Georgia relations.
EU institutions such as the Directorate-General for Enlargement or the European External Action Service, however, do have direct influence. If they were to explicitly declare that elections were falsified and the government illegitimate, all negotiations between the EU and Georgia would immediately end.
The EU is a major power. It tries to bring these actors to the negotiating table using political and soft-power tools and to reach consensus first and foremost aimed at easing the grip of an authoritarian regime, releasing people, and returning the country to a democratic path. That is why its actions are diplomatic, though still quite firm.
Does firmness mean that Ivanishvili’s circle should expect sanctions?
One thing must be considered: the fact that ‘Georgian Dream’ has taken such draconian steps means that Russia’s influence on its decisions is indeed very strong.
No government that truly represents its country and people would sacrifice its country like this without massive external pressure. I believe there is very strong pressure or encouragement from Russia. Georgia has effectively been sacrificed to distance it from the EU.
The EU sees this as well: if Georgia is under Russian influence, it must be careful not to push the country entirely into Russia’s mouth.
What ‘Georgian Dream’ did today through the Prosecutor’s Office is, in practice, a provocation aimed at forcing the EU to cut relations with Georgia. But that is exactly what Russia wants—to provoke and geopolitically lock Georgia in.
I mean not only blocking Georgia’s European perspective, but also shutting down geopolitical and geoeconomic projects that pass through Georgia and connect Europe and Asia with Central Asia.
At that point, the Georgian government would say: “You don’t want relations fine.” The corridor might remain, but fully under Russian control, governed by Russian decisions, which would obviously put EU interests at serious risk.
The EU understands this and is trying, through diplomatic and balanced policies, not to fall into this provocation so as not to harm the Georgian people, Georgia as a state, and EU geopolitical interests.
So the EU is not allowing ‘Georgian Dream’ to fully carry out this plan?
Yes, exactly.
What could logically be Ivanishvili’s next step?
That is very difficult to say this is not just Ivanishvili’s thinking at work; he is acting together with Russia.
We should probably expect further restrictions on democracy in Georgia, aimed at leaving the EU with no option but to abandon the country.
Neither Ivanishvili nor Russia want the corridor to be completely closed. Russia wants to control it. That would give it leverage to blackmail the EU: “Behave, or I’ll close the corridor.” For example, shutting Georgian ports to EU shipping.
To achieve this, they need to suppress protests in Georgia.
Does this require fully crushing protests?
A certain, limited level of protest may even suit them.
It allows them to accuse the opposition more easily. For example, the claim of attempting to seize a strategic facility during the October 4 rally is absurd, but it serves ‘Georgian Dream’s rhetoric: “You see, they were planning a coup; we have enemies; we must take measures to protect sovereignty and stability.”
That is why a small dose of protest may actually be useful to them.
They need to discredit the entire spectrum of opposition forces. Media outlets must be shut down—media like yours, for example.
They believe that in such a scenario, people will fully submit to the information flows and decisions controlled by ‘Georgian Dream.’
Those of us who lived in the Soviet Union know how one-sided information works. I listened to Voice of America from childhood, yet even I lacked a full understanding of the West.
This is what is happening in Russia and Belarus. Nothing new. Before they fully complete this process and shut the lid on Georgia, they need small protests to pressure, imprison, neutralize people, and gradually bring everything under control.
The Soviet Union also had dissidents weak and limited ones. They could destroy them, but it was useful to keep them: “Look, we have enemies; that’s why we have problems; that’s why we can’t do everything as we want.”
Are sanctions a real lever to stop ‘Georgian Dream’?
Sanctions alone, of course, will not solve the problem. Anyone who naively believes that sanctioning Ivanishvili will immediately end ‘Georgian Dream’ is mistaken.
Authoritarian regimes can survive even complete isolation. Look at Belarus. Look at Albania—it was fully isolated for decades, the poorest country in Europe, yet the regime survived until democracy prevailed across Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
North Korea is fully isolated. Venezuela is practically isolated. Yet these regimes persist.
Authoritarian mentality is a separate psychological phenomenon: why would someone want to turn their country into a concentration camp and still be content? It requires study. The regime relies on loyal people who live well. For them, material comfort is what matters.
What resources remain for resistance?
I don’t know. There are not enough resources. If there had been, mistakes would not have been made, such as boycotting local elections.
The people standing in the streets are heroes, absolutely. But remember the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae they delayed the enemy, and later a decisive battle took place. Those 300 played a critical role.
Street protest is very important, but the main battle should have been elsewhere—at elections. If the opposition had won in cities, everything would have ended there. ‘Georgian Dream’ would have had no choice but to bring the army out against the people.
Georgia must somehow get into the EU “get in” because it cannot enter normally. The EU is already looking at us skeptically. There are few progressive political parties. They think: we don’t know who is more dangerous the opposition or ‘Georgian Dream.’
Being in the EU is a mechanism to prevent the capture of democratic space. Despite strong authoritarian tendencies, Hungary still retains a democratic framework. If Orbán could, he would establish a dictatorship worse than Ivanishvili’s.
Is this framework a guarantee that repressive laws cannot be adopted? Hungary adopted a Russian-style law, but the EU court overturned it.
Yes. Hungary adopted such a law in 2015, and the EU court annulled it. Later they tried again, thinking they had found a workaround, but that too was overturned.
Because Hungary is in the EU, people still have the opportunity to hold elections, and it appears that Orbán and his party may be voted out as early as this spring.