Russia has opened a new trade terminal in Gali.
Astamur Akhsalba, CEO of a transit logistics company operating in de facto Abkhazia, says that test shipments have already been carried out from the new terminal.
According to him, the project had been kept secret for years due to the complex geopolitical situation and Georgia’s proximity. He claims that all necessary procedures have now been completed and that the terminal will begin full-scale operations within a few months.
Akhsalba also states that “Abkhazia is restoring its function as a historical hub” and that the terminal located in the Gali district will become an important part of a transit scheme between Russia and third countries.
On December 10, journalists asked Georgian Dream Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze how such a large trade terminal could have been built secretly in Gali without any official reaction from Tbilisi.
“I do not know. No steps have been taken by us in this direction,” Kobakhidze said, adding that “the Georgian side will not allow cargo transit.”
How can it be explained that Tbilisi failed to notice and respond to a large-scale infrastructure project on occupied territory for years? Batumelebi discussed this issue with security expert, former deputy secretary of the National Security Council, and former member of the 10th Parliament of Georgia, Teona Akubardia.
Ms. Akubardia, is it possible that official Tbilisi was unaware of the construction of a new infrastructure facility on occupied territory?
Naturally, it is impossible not to know something that everyone beyond the Enguri bridge could see, including drone footage broadcast by Georgian television media as early as 2023. In addition, the state has relevant intelligence services that should have had information about this much earlier.
What I find far more concerning than claims of ignorance is the silence of official Tbilisi. It reminds me of the lack of reaction when the Sukhumi airport was illegally transferred to Russia, followed later by its unlawful reconstruction and opening. The same applies to the transfer of the Pitsunda state dachas to Russia and the decision to deploy a permanent Russian naval presence in the Ochamchire port, all without a clear position from Tbilisi.
This is especially alarming given that the Kremlin intensified annexation processes in occupied Abkhazia in parallel with launching a full-scale war against Ukraine. This coincided with Georgia’s openly pro-Russian foreign policy shift, the adoption of Russian-style laws, and the spread of anti-Western disinformation and propaganda, using the same narratives that the Kremlin employed in occupied Abkhazia, including the so-called second front narrative.
What does the opening of a trade terminal in Gali mean? Is it an economic project or a hybrid military-logistical move?
Naturally, the transit hub project coincides with Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine and the Kremlin’s interest in maintaining trade with third countries under Western sanctions. This is openly acknowledged by the terminal’s CEO himself.
At the same time, this project is part of a broader Kremlin strategy and can be understood as an attempt to achieve two objectives simultaneously.
On the one hand, it serves as a sanctions evasion mechanism, including plans to restore the railway to Gali and eventually connect it to the rest of Georgia through occupied Abkhazia, something stated directly and indirectly in Akhsalba’s interview. On the other hand, it aims to pressure official Tbilisi into signing a non-use-of-force agreement, which would mark the beginning of recognition of so-called Abkhaz independence. This becomes much easier in the context of Georgia’s isolation from the West and following the conclusions of Tsulukiani’s so-called treason commission. Ultimately, this would formalize a fragmented Georgia of three entities firmly embedded in Russia’s sphere of influence.
In recent years, signs of Russian annexation have become increasingly evident both in occupied Abkhazia and in non-occupied but Russian-influenced Tbilisi. Whether this process succeeds depends first on public resistance, and then on regional and international security factors.
I found it notable that Georgian Dream MP Gia Volski told Formula TV that trade is generally a good thing and that he could see such a possibility if major states reached an agreement.
The same applies to Irakli Kobakhidze’s remarks, where he referred to the Geneva discussions but failed to mention that under those agreements there should not have been a customs terminal in Gali. Customs checkpoints were envisaged only in Psou and Zugdidi, on territory controlled by Georgia, and even those were never implemented due to Russia’s lack of political will. In the past, Georgian governments would have appealed to Western partners for support in such cases. This was not mentioned either, and could hardly have been mentioned by Kobakhidze given his confrontation with the West.
Therefore, such comments either indicate preparation for a future scenario involving this route or once again reflect a familiar tactic of shifting blame to the previous government, similar to the Tsulukiani commission, in service of Kremlin interests.
How will the new Gali terminal change the security dynamics along the occupation line? Are there risks of smuggling or military cargo transit?
First and foremost, the risk concerns Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Russia seeks to evade sanctions. The existence of this terminal, currently awaiting a favorable moment to become operational, reveals a desire to move the so-called border closer to Gali.
Russia also seeks to restore railway connections. The railway issue is not part of the Geneva discussions. Bidzina Ivanishvili has lobbied for the railway since coming to power, as has the Kremlin, including through the Russia-Georgia Business Council created in 2023 under the Silk Road framework.
If the railway becomes operational, it would provide Russia with a significant opportunity to restore its diminished influence through economic leverage, including within the TRIP project, the Trump Route or South Caucasus Transport and Economic Initiative.
Do you believe Georgian Dream is deliberately trying to downplay this issue? Why would it suit the government to ignore such a large infrastructure project on occupied territory?
I have already addressed this partly, but when asking what Georgian Dream’s interest could be in damaging territorial integrity, beyond financial motives, the answer is power retention through Kremlin support. Otherwise, their silence and attacks on the West are incomprehensible. It was Western support that underpinned Georgia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the non-recognition policy.
What impact will the new terminal have on relations with partner countries? Does the Gali terminal signal a new phase of Russian pressure, and how will this affect Georgia’s cooperation with the US and the EU?
If this Russian project is implemented, Georgia will effectively be formalized as a client state of Russia, and referring to Western countries as partners will likely no longer be relevant.
It may still be premature to draw final conclusions before the situation fully unfolds, but the intention is clearly visible.
What impact will the new terminal have on the local population in Gali in terms of security?
At this stage, I cannot assess the direct impact on the Gali population. However, the implementation of this project would have catastrophic consequences for Georgia’s territorial integrity and national interests. That is why it is vital to discuss this issue openly and assess the risks.