“Russian forces had planted anti-tank mines on the roads and deployed loitering drones, so-called ‘zhduns’ (‘waiters’). The Ukrainians used armored mine-clearing vehicles at the head of their columns, equipped with mine-clearing rollers. This allowed their equipment to approach the assault line quickly and without losses. Thanks to the highly effective fire support provided by the ‘Abrams’ tanks, Ukrainian armored vehicles were able to advance directly to the houses where Russian troops were entrenched,” retired Major General Vakhtang Kapanadze explains how Ukrainian forces pushed Russian troops back in Kupiansk.
Kupiansk is the city about which Putin was reportedly briefed three times as having been “captured.”
At what stage are negotiations on a ceasefire? If the fighting stops, when would Ukraine be able to regain its territories?
“Ukraine must be strengthened to such an extent, and Russia weakened to such a degree, that Ukraine will be able to reclaim its lost territories by its own means… The analogue of NATO’s Article 5 has nothing to do with this. So-called Article 5–type supporting actions would be triggered only if Ukraine were attacked again. One side may violate a ceasefire agreement. If a country wants to, it will always find a pretext—whether provocation or some other reason,” says Vakhtang Kapanadze.
Batumelebi interviewed retired Major General Vakhtang Kapanadze. He holds a doctorate in military sciences and served twice as Chief of the General Staff of Georgia. Vakhtang Kapanadze is an advisor to the analytical organization “GeoCase.”
Mr. Vakhtang, President Zelensky says he will soon meet with Donald Trump. “Many things could be decided before the New Year,” Zelensky wrote on December 26. In your view, how much has the likelihood of a ceasefire increased at this stage?
It is a fact that certain steps are being taken in that direction. At the beginning of this year, in an interview with you, I said I hoped a ceasefire would happen by the end of the year. This trend has indeed intensified. This time, according to the Americans, the issue could be resolved within 90 days. Calls for a Christmas ceasefire have largely been rejected by Putin. The fact remains that negotiations are ongoing, and we shall see.
I do not believe Putin will show goodwill and declare a ceasefire for several days over the New Year.
As you know, the 20 points that Zelensky publicly outlined have already been handed over to Russia. The first signals coming from Russia indicate that it wants to introduce amendments, particularly regarding territories and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. We will see what steps follow.
Ukraine demands a ceasefire along the current de facto line of hostilities, while Russia demands the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donetsk Oblast. What fundamentally changes in Zelensky’s 20-point plan?
Nothing changes. What changes is an alternative option proposed by the Americans: the creation of an economically free zone in the region, which would imply its demilitarization. Ukraine agrees to this in principle, but a demilitarized zone without Russian troop withdrawal is impossible. Zelensky is ready to hold a referendum in Ukraine on this American alternative, which involves creating a demilitarized zone. However, this referendum would consider all 20 points, not just one.
What is new is Ukraine’s demand that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant be managed by the United States and Ukraine, without the involvement of a third party—Russia.
Does agreeing to the demilitarization of Donetsk Oblast constitute a compromise by Ukraine? What compromise could Russia make at this stage?
Russia would benefit from both Russian and Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Donetsk Oblast. Essentially, this territory corresponds to Donbas, which Donetsk Oblast would absorb in practice.
The document Zelensky referred to is one that Russia will reject. It does not include declaring the Russian language a second state language, nor other conditions Russia insists on, including its vision for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which Moscow believes should be jointly managed by American and Russian sides.
It is difficult to determine what is going on in Putin’s mind. At the very least, a state of war suits him for managing the internal situation in Russia and for portraying himself as a major figure while intimidating Europe. I cannot say how far Putin will go. Likely, more steps are needed, including from the United States, to convince Russia and eventually bring it to sign an agreement after certain changes.
If a ceasefire is declared along the current line of hostilities, as Ukraine demands, under what conditions could Ukraine fight to regain its territories?
Only if it becomes strong enough to do so. A ceasefire, of course, does not mean the end of the war.
But doesn’t the principle of NATO’s Article 5—or an analogue of it—come into play? Would Ukraine be able, for example, to launch a counteroffensive?
If a ceasefire is declared, it means fighting stops for a certain period. How effective that period would be is another matter.
Ukraine must be strengthened to such an extent, and Russia weakened to such a degree, that Ukraine can reclaim its lost territories on its own. The analogue of Article 5 has nothing to do with this. Supporting actions under such an analogue would be triggered only if Ukraine were attacked again.
One side may violate a ceasefire. If a country wants to, it will always find a reason—provocation or otherwise.
Azerbaijan and Armenia had a ceasefire agreement—what happened afterward? So a pretext can always be found.
The key issue is whether Ukraine will have the capability to reclaim these territories after a ceasefire. What is the point of breaking a ceasefire if you cannot achieve anything? What matters is what situation develops inside Russia during this period—how weakened Russia becomes.
What do the ongoing negotiations indicate regarding Ukrainian elections? Will Zelensky be allowed to run as a candidate?
Russia demands that Zelensky not participate in the elections. Whether Ukrainians will agree is another matter. Negotiations are ongoing, and this is one of the issues.
What is changing directly on the front line?
The situation is complicated in several sectors. Let us start with Kupiansk, where Ukraine has achieved success. Essentially, the entire eastern part is under Ukrainian control. Until recently, Russia controlled three out of eleven villages in the Kupiansk district—Kondrashivka, Ratkivka, and Moskovka. Today, Russia no longer controls even these. During the Kupiansk counteroffensive, Ukrainians successfully used American Abrams tanks to support their operations.
Russian forces had placed anti-tank mines on the roads and deployed loitering drones, so-called “zhduns.” Ukrainians used armored mine-clearing vehicles with rollers at the head of their columns. This allowed them to approach the assault line rapidly and without losses. With highly effective fire support from Abrams tanks, Ukrainian armored vehicles advanced directly to the houses where Russian troops were entrenched.
Ukrainians actively used armored vehicles. The myth that armored vehicles are no longer relevant on the battlefield is simply not true.
The Kupiansk and Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad directions became more active in parallel with negotiations. Russians tried to show that they had taken Kupiansk, Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, and so on. Ukrainians managed, especially in Kupiansk, to inflict a political defeat on Putin.
Putin had previously been briefed that Kupiansk was captured
Putin was briefed three times that Kupiansk was under Russian control. Putin himself publicly stated that Kupiansk had been taken.
However, Russians have failed to establish full control over Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad for more than a year and a half. They have been unable to finally dislodge Ukrainians from the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration.
Russians captured the Ukrainian city of Siversk. Here is what happened: during attacks toward Siversk and Kupiansk, Ukraine had to choose one direction, as it lacked sufficient forces to reinforce both. Ukraine chose Kupiansk. Siversk has effectively been leveled since 2022, constantly under bombardment. Defending Kupiansk was deemed more viable, and Ukraine succeeded.
Siversk gives Russians an opportunity to attack Sloviansk and Kramatorsk from the east, since they cannot break through from Pokrovsk. Even then, they would have to pass through several settlements well prepared for defense, such as Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka.
From Siversk to Sloviansk is about 30 kilometers, but the task is not easy. Russians would not need to cross the Siverskyi Donets River; they plan to attack from its southern bank, which looks favorable on the map. However, the terrain is problematic—ravines, swampy areas along the southern bank, and industrial waste heaps, mines, and slag piles.
By capturing Siversk, Russians can attempt to straighten the line along the Chasiv Yar–Yampil axis and try to seize the city of Lyman. This would allow them to prepare more effectively for an attack on Kramatorsk and Sloviansk.
For the first time in this war, Russian airborne units captured a battalion-level command post of Ukraine’s 102nd Territorial Defense Brigade. The post was taken without evacuation of matériel—laptops, documents, and maps were left on tables. Russians are circulating videos of this on social media. This occurred in the south-central direction near Huliaipole.
A battalion command post is typically located about 2 kilometers behind the front line. This is not a great depth, but questions arise as to why it was not relocated in time. An investigation has been launched in Ukraine.
This incident shows that territorial defense units are generally less combat-capable on the front line compared to professional units.
What is the situation regarding military and human resources on both sides? What happens if the fighting continues?
If no ceasefire occurs and Russia continues its offensive at the current pace, it would take at least three years, at best, to capture Donbas. Since 2022, Russia controls about 23% of Donbas, while Ukraine controls 22.5%. That is what Russia has achieved in three years and eight months.
Wall Street Journal data is telling: Russia’s rate of advance is slower than in major wars over the past 100 years. Even in World War I, with trench warfare and advances measured in meters, the pace was higher than today.
As for losses: over the past three months, the number of Russian forces in Ukraine has not increased significantly. Russia replenishes its grouping by about 30,000 troops per month, mainly to replace losses. Previously, this figure was around 10,000. Russia is unable to significantly reinforce its forces.
Ukraine also faces difficulties, including manpower shortages, but Western support has been evident. Up to €90 billion in aid is planned. There is also talk of the U.S. potentially transferring Tomahawk missiles in the future, which would further strengthen Ukraine’s capabilities.
When Russia threatens Europe, we should remember that the U.S. alone has 130,000 troops in Europe, plus seven F-35 squadrons, six mine countermeasure vessels, air defense systems, and more. Turkey has 355,000 troops, Poland 216,000, France 200,000, Germany 180,000, the UK 145,000—excluding smaller countries. Add Ukraine’s 800,000. This is an enormous force. Russia does not have the capability to wage war against such power.
However, I do not rule out provocations—unknown drones disrupting airports, airspace violations, sabotage, incursions, and temporary seizures of small areas. A large-scale armed confrontation would carry an extremely high risk for Russia.
If fighting stops in Ukraine, will Europe continue strengthening its defense systems? How capable is Europe of doing so without active U.S. involvement?
A ceasefire in Ukraine would only facilitate this strengthening. The war in Ukraine is not a threat to Europe; Russia is. The war in Ukraine is precisely what is stopping Russia.
Ukraine is a crucial shield for Europe, especially for Central Europe.
If fighting stops in Ukraine, Europe’s vulnerability will increase virtually—Russia would have more freedom to focus on Europe.
The West is systematically and methodically increasing its defense capabilities. This is Europe, where decisions are not made chaotically by a single individual. The process is deliberate, step by step, and thoughtful. It takes time. Once this machine is fully activated, it will work very effectively.
Even if the U.S. reduces its presence in Europe—though it has not done so yet—Trump faces strong resistance from American military leadership regarding any shift in NATO policy or declaring Russia “not an enemy.”
Even if the U.S. were to reduce its presence, Europe has a population of 520 million. Mobilizing 10–15% would yield a force of 52–60 million. A 500-million-strong Europe would face a 145-million-strong Russia. On Ukraine’s battlefield, Russia has introduced nothing fundamentally new in terms of weapons systems, unlike Europe. Europe has not even begun supplying its latest-generation weapons to Ukraine though if current cooperation continues, this may not be far off.
Russia’s only real advantage is the size of its nuclear arsenal, but I do not believe the U.S., or even China, would allow its use.
Many European countries have begun reviewing mobilization reserves. Germany and the UK are rapidly revitalizing their military-industrial complexes. Sweden is working on acquiring long-range missiles capable of reaching Moscow if necessary. France has begun reviving its volunteer reserve system. This mechanism is already at work. Once structural changes are completed, this machine will function. Historically and in modern times, the effectiveness of German, British, and French military systems is well known.