“Their actions are, first and foremost, an impulsive, nervous reaction, rather than even a minimal attempt to reflect on the criticism,” says Sandro Baramidze, Human Rights and Justice Program Manager at Transparency International Georgia, commenting on the Georgian Dream–controlled Prosecutor’s Office statement accusing imprisoned opposition leaders of sabotage and of assisting hostile activities “in favor of a foreign country.”
How does Georgian Dream plan to prove sabotage, and why does it avoid naming the “foreign countries” it labels as hostile? Batumelebi spoke with Sandro Baramidze about this issue.
Mr. Sandro, Georgian Dream has brought new charges against imprisoned opposition leaders, accusing them of sabotage and aiding “hostile activities of a foreign country.” Could such charges be used against other opponents as well, and how difficult will it be for Georgian Dream to substantiate them?
There are several points to highlight. First of all, it is noteworthy that these charges were brought the day after the European Commission published its enlargement report on Georgia, which assessed developments over the past year in extremely negative terms. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, even stated that under the current circumstances, Georgia has no remaining path to EU membership and that only the name of “candidate country” remains.
The same thing happened last November, when the European Parliament adopted a highly critical resolution on Georgia. The very next day, on November 28, Kobakhidze announced that all negotiations with the EU were being suspended.
This indicates that their actions are primarily impulsive, convulsive, and nervous reactions. Instead of even slightly reflecting on the criticism, they are taking steps that signal punishment of Georgian citizens for the fact that they themselves have derailed relations with the EU and, more broadly, with Western partners.
The second point is that Ivanishvili’s goal is to suffocate and shut down democracy in Georgia to eliminate representative democracy and political pluralism leaving behind a façade in which a few strange, two- or three-person “parties” exist, whose loyalty has been bought, while everyone else is eliminated.
If there is no real choice, then elections, in essence, will not exist either.
Such “elections” were held in the Soviet Union as well, though no one truly called them elections. That is precisely what Ivanishvili wants to replicate today.
In practice, with this new charge, they want to create a prejudicial ruling in the style of the Murusidze–Chinchaladze court system. The indictment contains no substantiated evidence, and the aim is for the Constitutional Court to say that it has no obligation to establish facts, because those facts were allegedly already “established” by, say, the Tbilisi City Court in the sabotage case.
Georgian Dream claims that imprisoned politicians were doing everything to impose international sanctions on Georgia. What kind of “crime” is that, and how could the prosecution even attempt to prove it?
It does not fit under any criminal offense. As you know, the investigation previously proceeded under three articles. Within that investigation, representatives of Nanuka’s Fund and other foundations were questioned before a magistrate judge, and later, in September, leaders of non-governmental organizations including our organization’s executive director, Eka Gigauri were interrogated. This is the same investigation, under the so-called sabotage and so-called assistance to hostile activities of a foreign country.
The issue of sanctions does not fit into the legal qualification of any of these articles. First of all, if you claim that someone assisted a “hostile state” or hostile organization, you must specify which hostile state that is which foreign country is hostile and allegedly benefiting from such assistance.
Do you think they could actually name an EU member state in court when required to define a “hostile country”?
I don’t know. However, there are certain allusions and hints in that direction in the conclusions of the Tsulukiani Commission, which form the basis of, for example, the constitutional lawsuit seeking to ban opposition parties.
In one or two places, they cite statements by a former US ambassador and remarks by the former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell. But directly accusing someone outright no, that has not happened.
If they cannot name the “hostile countries,” how will they prove the charges? For whom were these people allegedly working?
That is not the only thing they cannot prove. In fact, they cannot substantiate any of the charges under any of the articles including sabotage. There is absolutely no basis for it, let alone evidence.
They do not even describe the alleged actions. You must describe a specific act and explain how it constitutes the elements of a crime under a particular article of the Criminal Code. Nothing of the sort is described here.
Sabotage has effectively been charged against almost everyone. In some cases, it is the sole charge. Gvaramia, Melia, Khazaradze, and Japaridze are charged only with sabotage but what exactly constituted the sabotage? This is not explained.
If the argument is that there were permanent protests on Rustaveli Avenue, how does that amount to sabotage?
Sabotage would mean obstructing the functioning of Parliament to the extent that it cannot operate. That never happened.
As you know, during the adoption of the so-called “Russian law,” despite daily mass protests outside Parliament, its work was not interrupted for a single minute. Laws were adopted one after another, including that law itself, within a month and a half. So where is the sabotage, if the protests did not actually hinder Parliament’s work?
A prosecutor should think about this but they neither have the ability nor the obligation to think. Their only obligation is to do what they are told.
The indictment also mentions the dissemination of false information – for example, claims about oil imports and allegations that Georgian airspace was used to deliver Iranian combat drones to Russia. Such accusations could potentially be used against any opponent. What can you say about this?
I have not yet read the formal indictments or the alleged evidence, so I don’t know what they are relying on. But I strongly suspect that such evidence simply does not exist.
They also claimed that information was provided about the import of Russian oil products. But this information was reported by foreign media outlets and could not have been concealed.
I don’t know what their accusations are based on, but I can say one thing clearly: at the level of the EU, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and statements by EU leaders, the main criticism is directed at Georgian Dream itself — focusing on human rights violations.
People were beaten in the streets, tortured, unjustly tried, unjustly imprisoned, detained — and sanctions are imposed precisely because of this.
That is why the West no longer stands by Georgia. This is no longer described merely as democratic backsliding; it is the establishment of a dictatorship.
What do Iran, oil, or sanctions have to do with this?
The beating of people was a fact, covered by both local and international media. On what basis can they claim that politicians “supplied information” to foreign countries, when these facts were already public?
They will not be able to prove anything.
These sanctions are essentially entry bans — travel bans to certain countries, such as Germany, the Czech Republic, and others. They are imposed because of Georgian Dream’s human rights violations, not because Georgia has been implicated in anything else.
This is about trampling on human rights, the usurpation of power, the collapse of the rule of law, and the defeat of democracy. That is why the entire West views Georgian Dream as an authoritarian regime.
Why did they bring up Mikheil Saakashvili and claim that an imprisoned individual was allegedly undermining the government via social networks?
That is another propaganda trick, meant to somehow “reinforce” their hollow, pseudo-legal constitutional lawsuit.
Their empty rhetoric will not influence society, because they have no real support. Their only resource is administrative power maintained through bribery and intimidation.
The level of public support they have was demonstrated even in the local elections, where many people did not participate at all, and where Kaladze received only about 20% of the electorate in Tbilisi.
Even that 20% would not have been possible without fear, administrative pressure, and dependence on pensions and salaries.
NGOs were also mentioned as allegedly acting together with opposition leaders. Do you think this was intentional, to later redirect pressure toward them?
Of course. That phrase was not included accidentally. Whether they move on to direct persecution of NGOs remains to be seen in the near future.
Is this primarily about personal revenge by Ivanishvili or party figures sanctioned by the West, combined with a desire to retain power?
The main thing that stands out is Ivanishvili’s fear of losing power. He has gone so far down the path of authoritarianism, repression, and state capture that he sees no alternative but to sink even deeper into this swamp.
However, no dictatorship has survived indefinitely. Even powerful regimes like the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany eventually collapsed. More recent examples include Syria and Libya.
But there are also examples like Azerbaijan and Turkey, where authoritarian regimes still rule. Is that what Ivanishvili hopes for?
Turkey and Azerbaijan are still very different cases. But we will see how things end in Turkey once Erdoğan is no longer constitutionally eligible to run for office.
As for Aliyev, the situation is different: he is an authoritarian ruler, but he has a strong foundation in oil and gas revenues, which provide economic backing for his regime. His successes, including in Nagorno-Karabakh, also generate public loyalty.
None of these factors exist in Georgia. Ivanishvili has neither oil nor gas nor any comparable success.
But he does have Russia’s support.
Yes, he does. That is, in fact, what sustains his regime — his role as a Russian proxy, aligned with the Russian system.
However, when the Russian regime itself faces serious setbacks for example, after defeat in Ukraine, which I am convinced will happen this will trigger a chain reaction with consequences for Ivanishvili’s regime as well.